According to reports from the local village heads that spoke with KHRG, no villagers were injured or killed during the shelling and all managed to flee their villages and take refuge at temporary hiding sites in the forest. While many villagers had to flee without warning, three villagers interviewed by KHRG following the attacks on February 25th described how people in their communities, or they themselves, moved to safety because of warnings received from other villagers. The village head of Gklaw Bpaw Kee, a village in Saw Muh Bplaw village tract from which residents fled during the shelling, described how other community members came to warn him of the attack while he was in his hill field outside the village. He explained that, even though the villagers were unable to find him at that time, they fired three warning shots from a gun to communicate that Tatmadaw troops were firing mortars near the village.[6]

"The SPDC Army [Tatmadaw soldiers] based in Plah Koh army camp came to operate and fired [mortars] at the Dteh Neh area. They saw some of the villagers' huts and fired at them many times. I didn't know any news about this, as it happened [the morning after] I had gone to my hill field for the night. So, my villagers worried about me very much and went to find me. They didn't reach me, but they went near my hill field and warned me by firing a gun three times. Therefore, I knew that the SPDC Army had come to fire at the villagers in the village. Then, I fled back immediately to my village and didn't see any villagers. I was very afraid and went to find my villagers, and then I saw them in the forest."

- Saw T--- (male, 40), Village head, Gklaw Bpaw Kee village, Lu Thaw Township (March 2nd 2011)

Many communities use self-protection strategies like those described by villagers interviewed by KHRG after the attacks on February 25th. Strategies used by villagers and documented by KHRG include: sharing information via radio communications; monitoring troop movements and maintaining general states of alertness to signals of attack; posting lookouts; and establishing agreed-upon signals to warn communities of impending attacks. Prior to the attacks on February 25th, for example, residents of at least Saw Muh Bplaw village tract had noted evidence of Tatmadaw movements, and returned to warn their community. In other locations, as described by Saw T--- above, residents fired an agreed-upon warning of three musket shots to warn residents beyond shouting distance.

"When it came into the morning we went to cut trees [to prepare our paddy field]. We had cut down only three trees and then… we heard from far away… people shot to let us know, so we came back to our house… They shot to let us know the situation wasn't good… They shot three times so we'd understand."

- Saw T--- (male, 40), Village head, Gklaw Bpaw Kee village, Lu Thaw Township (March 2nd 2011)

It is important to note that alarms and early warning systems also often entail civilians cultivating relationships with non-state armed groups that are in a position to share military intelligence useful for communities seeking to avoid attack.[7] In the case of attacks on February 25th, however, villagers appear to have used strategies that were wholly local and independent, without receiving warning from any external source.

"I didn't hear about it from the Karen National Union [KNU]. The villagers came back and informed us [that the Tatmadaw was active nearby] when they saw the path that the SPDC Army [Tatmadaw soldiers] had used during their patrol."

- Saw L---, 30, Village head, Dteh Neh village, Saw Muh Bplaw village tract, Lu Thaw Township (March 1st 2011)

In the case of attacks on February 25th, alarms and early warning systems were employed to prevent death and injury to civilians, who are deliberately targeted by Tatmadaw troops in upland areas. Not all communities received warnings, however; residents of Hsaw Gker Der, for example, told KHRG of having to flee suddenly and without warning. In a separate incident, a few days earlier on February 18th 2011, Saw B---, 45, was shot and killed by Tatmadaw troops, near Si Day village in Kay Bpoo village tract, farther north along the Pwa Ghaw to Kler Lah road. Saw B--- was carrying a rifle or musket for hunting small game at the time; Saw M---, the Kay Bpoo village tract leader, reported that Tatmadaw soldiers took the gun from him, along with his watch, food and some money, after he was shot. According to another villager interviewed by KHRG, Saw B--- was a member of his village's 'gher der' home guard,[8] and was gathering information about Tatmadaw troop movements along the section of the Pwa Ghaw to Kler Lah vehicle road that passes near his village at the time he was killed. KHRG has yet to confirm further details of this incident, including whether Saw M--- was directly participating in hostilities at the time he was killed. Three other residents of Kay Bpoo village tract interviewed by KHRG in 2011 mentioned that Tatmadaw forces have been active in Kay Bpoo village tract along the Pwa Ghaw to Kler Lah road since January 2011, as rations have been transported rations using both trucks and convict porters.

"Villagers haven't got injured [in Kay Bpoo] but they shot one villager yesterday [recently]. The villager's name is Saw B---. He's a Si Day villager. He's 45 years old. He's single. … They [the soldiers who shot Saw B---] took several things. As we know, they took a watch, some money, a gun for shooting animals and snacks."

- Saw M---, 40, Kay Bpoo village tract leader, Lu Thaw Township, Papun District (March 9th 2011)

While villagers were able to effectively avoid injury during the attack on February 25th, the head of Dteh Neh village reported that troops from LIB #252 subsequently entered, looted and destroyed civilians' houses and possessions in Dteh Neh village; five other local village heads in Saw Muh Bplaw village tract offered reports that confirmed the details or location of this incident. The Dteh Neh village head reported that one house was burned down, two rice barns were destroyed and villagers' animals were taken and eaten by Tatmadaw soldiers. Other sources reported that the soldiers had destroyed five other houses and agricultural equipment after entering Dteh Neh. According to the KHRG field researcher who conducted interviews and photo documentation in Dteh Neh village, paddy grains were also poured out of a rice store which contained 120 tins of paddy (1254 kg. / 2765 lb.), and Tatmadaw soldiers made holes in or otherwise purposefully damaged food and water storage containers and kitchen implements. Photographs taken the next day by a KHRG researcher depict systematic repetition of the same types of acts: walls kicked in and centre-posts pulled down, house-by-house; animal enclosures and gardens shot at or hacked with machetes; food supplies thrown on the ground and trod over with boots; cooking implements burned or beaten out of shape.

"As these villagers are displaced villagers, they had to flee in fear suddenly during the shelling. Then, the SPDC Army [Tatmadaw soldiers] came to burn down a villager's hut and destroyed two rice barns. They also took villagers' animals to eat and went back to their army camp immediately. … They shelled over 30 mortars. … They ate seven ducks of M--- and one goat belonging to D---'s mother. … They burned Ht---'s mother's paddy. … They burned 90 big tins of paddy (941 kg. / 2074 lb.). … They also burned paddy kept in a rice barn. They burned one rice barn owned by N---'s mother. … It was more than 10 or around 20 big tins of paddy (105 – 209 kg. / 230 – 461 lb.). … They took all the rice owned by K--- and also took a lot of other property. They [the damaged property] will cost over 50,000 [baht]. … They destroyed all the buildings to keep the ducks or other animals [pens] by firing bullets. They also broke all pots, pans, plates, and so on."

- Saw L---, 30, Village head, Dteh Neh village, Saw Muh Bplaw village tract, Lu Thaw Township, Papun District (March 1st 2011)

"They patrolled around villages inside the Dteh Boh Bplaw area. At first they didn't enter any villages, but then when they entered [a village] they burned one house, along with everything in the house, including one rice mill. They also destroyed villagers' houses, poured out stored paddy grains and destroyed mattocks. Everything they saw, they destroyed it all. The place [where they burned a house] is called Dteh Neh. … In that house, there were lots of things. The house owner sold many things in that house [shop] so many kinds of things were burned with the house. Under the house, one rice mill was burned and they also shot many times at the rice mill. … The person who had his house burned is Saw Pe---. … The owner [Saw P---] notified us that the total value was 58,000 baht (approximately US $1,910). … They destroyed a total of four houses, including one house [that was] burned. For the other three, they destroyed those too, and also one chicken pen. … Before they entered the villages, they shot many times and didn't kill or catch villagers, because the villagers were also aware of it. Villagers and children all fled to safety."

- Saw H---, 37, Village head, Hsaw Paw Der village, Plah Koh village tract, Luthaw Township, Papun District (March 1st 2011)

"At 7:30 in the morning, the SPDC [Tatmadaw soldiers] suddenly came and fired [mortars] at villagers in their field huts. We heard a lot of shelling and we had to flee suddenly. The SPDC Army [Tatmadaw soldiers] shelled a lot of mortars. We were very afraid that the mortars would hit us. We couldn't bring anything when we fled. We just fled. This SPDC unit [Tatmadaw LIB #252] entered one villager's house and destroyed two rice barns, and went back."

- Saw N---, 40, Village head, Ler Kleh village, Plah Koh village tract, Luthaw Township, Papun District (March 2nd
2011)

The incidents on February 25th demonstrate that patterns of Tatmadaw practices previously documented by KHRG continue today as in the past; villages are shelled remotely, after which troop columns sometimes enter the recently abandoned villages to loot and destroy villagers' houses and possessions.[9] In particular, these recent events conform to a pattern of attacks which KHRG has documented in upland areas of Papun District, as well as in adjacent areas of Nyaunglebin and Toungoo Districts, since the termination of the 2005-2008 Offensive in northern Karen State. While no coordinated multi-battalion offensive on the area appears to have yet resumed, periodic attacks targeting civilians continue.[10] The use of temporary strategic displacement by villagers in the face of such physical security threats also continues to be widely utilised by communities in this area, as documented by KHRG, during both sustained multi-battalion offensives and during seasonal shelling and patrol operations.